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SECURITY INFORMATION

*Vietnam*

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NSC BRIEFING

8 November 1954

SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I. Reactions to General Collins' mission vary.

A. Paris officials welcome it;  
hope US support for Diem waning.

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B. 

C. General Ely feared mission would appear as US intent "takeover"

D. But later his deputy described it as logical move.

E. Added, French position is: Diem must make peace with army, get capable interior minister (no doubt Tam)

II. Bao Dai still very much in the act.

A. Saw Collins mission useful to demand Diem be more co-operative.

- B. Says he is father of "naughty children" who must be brought into line.
  - C. His emissary now in Saigon with order to Hinh proceed Paris for consultations, but Bao Dai sees Hinh's services still essential and wants Bay Vien in cabinet.
  - D. Diem reportedly having trouble raising some \$1,500,000, price for Bao Dai's "support."
- III. Meanwhile Buu Hoi build-up growing.
- A. French press giving him big play.
  - B. Has backing of some of Mendes' principal advisers.
  - C. They reported pressuring Bao Dai to put him in before Mendes leaves for US.
- IV. Several possible French motives for backing Buu Hoi.

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- A. One may be keep pot boiling,  
leave room for maneuver.
- B. More important, Buu Hoi's  
background jibes with French  
desires get along with Viet Minh.
- C. Buu Hoi "incredibly naive,"  
according Heath, thus probably  
easily manipulated.
- D. Diem describes him as not immoral,  
but amoral, a "seive for money,"  
with two French and other  
mistresses.
- E. Told Diem year ago he for Viet  
Minh because it efficient.

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